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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between market structure and platformsincentives
to adopt technological innovations in two-sided markets, where platforms may nd it
optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and to extract surplus on the ad-
vertising side. We consider innovations that a¤ect the two sides in an opposite way.
We compare private incentives with social incentives and nd that the bias in tech-
nology adoption depends crucially on whether the non-negative pricing constraint
binds or not. Our results provide a rationale for a tougher competition policy to
curb concentration if competition authorities put more weight on consumer surplus
in welfare calculations.
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1 Introduction
The public sentiment regarding digital platforms has changed recently since the revelation
of the Cambridge Analytica scandal with people becoming more concerned about market
concentration and big platformsmarket power (Kahn, 2016). There have been several
initiatives proposing modication of the current framework of competition policy in order
to promote competition and curb concentration of market power in the area of digital
platforms; see for instance the ACCC report (2019), the CMA report (2020), the Furman
report (2019), the Stigler report (Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms, 2019), the
Vestager report (Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer, 2019).
A challenge to competition policy in the area of digital platforms arises from the fact
that many two-sided platforms provide free services to consumers and generate revenue by
charging the other side such as advertisers or application developers (Rochet and Tirole,
2005; Amelio and Jullien, 2012; Choi and Jeon, forthcoming). When the service is free,
consumer harm from the exercise of market power does not take the form of a higher
price. Instead, consumer harm is likely to be manifested in terms of lower quality of
service, more nuisance from advertisements or less privacy protection (Newman, 2015,
2016). Furthermore, the digital platform industry is a dynamic one in which innovations
play a major role. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how market power shapes digital
platformsincentives to innovate. In fact, all reports mentioned above commonly argue
that a major harm from concentration of platform market power consists of distortions
in innovation incentives. To quote the CMA report (2020, p.7),
"First, competition problems may inhibit innovation and the development
of new, valuable services for consumers. ....This impact on innovation is likely
to be the largest source of consumer harm."
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no formal investigation of
the relationship between platform market power and innovation incentives. This paper
attempts to ll this gap by addressing how market power a¤ects platformsincentives to
adopt technological innovations. More specically, we consider two-sided platforms which
may nd it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and to extract surplus
on the advertising side. Adoption of innovations can a¤ect both consumer gross surplus
and advertiser gross surplus. We characterize private incentives to trade o¤ consumer
surplus reduction (respectively, increase) with advertiser surplus increase (respectively,
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reduction) and compare them to social incentives across di¤erent market structures: a
monopoly platform and duopoly competitive bottleneck. In particular, we focus on which
kind of biases in innovation adoption incentive arise due to platform market power. We
endogenously derive conditions under which platforms provide free services and point out
the importance of the non-negative price constraint (NPC) by showing that the bias in
technology adoption depends crucially on whether the services are provided for free (i.e.,
the NPC is binding) or at a positive price (i.e., the NPC is not binding). This result
suggests that the formulation of optimal antitrust policies towards the platform market
can be substantially di¤erent for markets where services are provided for free.
Our analysis can also be reinterpreted as platformsincentives to adopt certain business
policies that create trade-o¤s between the consumer and the advertiser side. First, a
platforms privacy policy can be interpreted as having a similar e¤ect as a technology
adoption in that collection of consumerssensitive information may impose privacy costs
on the consumers, but may help increase advertising revenues. A second policy available to
platforms concerns "ad load"; an increase in ad load would decrease consumer surplus but
increases advertising revenues per consumer. "Search engines like Google can determine
the overall limit on the number of ads that appear in search results and how these ads are
presented alongside organic search results (the CMA Report, 2020, p. 229)." Similarly,
"Facebook can directly set the ad load by determining the ad gap the ratio of advertising
to organic content users see when interacting with the platform (the CMAReport, 2020, p.
256).Finally, big tech platforms can control the balance, in their ad auction mechanisms,
between ad price and quality (i.e., relevance of ads shown to users) by choosing how much
weight to place on quality metrics in determining the winning bid for ad slots; a lower
weight on quality and relevance metrics induces higher bidding prices and generate more
revenue, but reduces the quality of the platform services for users (the CMA Report,
2020, p. 230 and p. 256). The choices of platforms on these policy dimensions can also
be analyzed in our theoretical framework.
In one-sided markets, one can consider either a quality-increasing innovation or a cost-
reducing innovation and study private incentives to adopt it by incurring a xed cost and
compare it with a social planners incentives. What is interesting in a two-sided platform
is that one can consider innovations that a¤ect the two sides in an opposite way and
study a platforms incentive to trade-o¤ the gain from one side against the loss from the
other side without an explicit consideration of adoption costs. To illustrate this point,
consider a potential technology without any xed cost of adoption. If it a¤ects both sides
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in the same way, private incentives are aligned with social incentives: all platforms want
to adopt innovations which increase surplus on both sides and no platforms wants to
adopt innovations which reduce surplus on both sides. In contrast, for instance, when we
consider an innovation which increases advertiser surplus but reduces consumer surplus,
private incentives to adopt such innovation may not be aligned with social incentives.
We characterize both the locus of technology adoption that yields the same prot to a
platform and the one that yields the same welfare and compare the two. We say that
a platforms innovation incentive is biased toward a consumer-surplus increasing (hence,
advertiser-surplus decreasing) technology when it adopts a consumer-surplus increasing
technology which would not be adopted by a social planner. Symmetrically, we say that a
platforms innovation incentive is biased toward an advertiser-surplus increasing (hence,
consumer-surplus decreasing) technology when it adopts an advertiser-surplus increasing
technology which would not be adopted by a social planner.
To analyze potential market biases in technology adoption for platform markets, we
develop a stylized model of two-sided markets with consumers on one side and advertisers
on the other side. We consider a typical situation in which each consumer the platforms
serve can generate additional surplus on the advertising side (represented by parameter
): We show that a zero price for consumers arises endogenously when  is su¢ ciently
large and show that the endogenously derived market price can be a critical determinant
of the direction of biases in technology adoption.
We rst consider a monopoly platform and analyze the benchmark case in which the
platform is able to extract the whole advertising surplus. In such a case, we establish
a key result of "pass-through rate equalization" when the NPC is not binding and the
services are provided at a positive price. This result shows that consumer net benet
from an increase in the gross value of the services to consumers (and a corresponding
price increase) is equal to tho one from an increase in the gross surplus on the advertising
side, which is passed over to consumers in terms of a reduced price. Even if the platform
does not internalize these external e¤ects on consumers, as the magnitudes of these two
external e¤ects are the same, there is no bias in technology adoption choice by the platform
compared to the social optimum. This result immediately implies that if the platform
cannot extract all the surplus from the advertising side, the platform would have biases
toward consumer-surplus increasing technology.
In contrast, when the NPC is binding and the services are provided for free, the
price does not respond any more to an increase in the value of services, which leads to
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biases toward advertiser-surplus increasing technology. At rst blush, this result may
be considered obvious because there is no revenue from the consumer side with a zero
price. However, recall that we derive zero price endogenously and this happens when the
advertising revenue per consumer is su¢ ciently large. This means that when the NPC
is binding, the platform has a higher incentive to attract additional consumers. As the
price is already zero, the only way to attract more consumers is to increase the value
of the services (represented by u) it provides. In fact, we show that the platform values
an increase in u relatively more than an increase in  compared to the case where the
services are provided at a positive price. Nonetheless, the platforms technology adoption
is biased toward  because a social planner values an increase in u even more than the
platform does when the NPC binds.
We also extend our analysis to a duopoly model of competitive bottleneck (Armstrong,
2005, and Armstrong and Wright, 2007) to investigate implications of competition on
technology adoption. When the NPC is not binding, we obtain a similar pass-through
rate equalization result even for the duopoly case with strategic e¤ects and show that
technology adoption choice is biased toward the consumer-side as in the monopoly case.
However, when the NPC is binding, additional strategic e¤ects can overturn the result in
the monopoly case. More specically, we show that when competition is weak, we have a
similar result to the monopoly case with technology adoption biased toward the advertiser
side. In contrast, if competition is su¢ ciently strong, business stealing e¤ects can lead to
a bias toward the consumer side.
Our results allow us to make the following predictions regarding digital platforms which
charge zero price to consumers as they monetize consumer attention. Initially when they
are nascent and face erce competition, they have strong incentives to innovate in order to
increase the consumer side surplus. However, once the market tips to them or after their
market power becomes entrenched, the same platforms, which were consumer advocates,
have strong incentives to introduce innovations/policies that increase the advertiser side
surplus to the detriment of consumer surplus. Therefore, our results provide a rationale
for a tougher competition policy to curb concentration if competition authorities are
more concerned with consumer surplus relative to the advertiser side surplus in welfare
calculations.
Our paper is related to the literature on technology adoption. In contrast to our
approach that investigates biases in technology adoption, the literature mostly focuses on
dynamic di¤usion process of new technologies. For instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985,
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1987) focus on the strategic aspects of technology adoption and shows that the technology
adoption pattern can be characterized by either preemptive adoption or delayed joint
adoption depending on the protability of the second-mover vs. the rst mover and
the speed of imitation. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) compare patenting incentives of an
incumbent with those of a potential entrant and shows that the incumbent has more
incentives to acquire the new substitute technology due to the e¢ ciency e¤ect when the
new technology can be used as a vehicle for entry. Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz
and Shapiro (1982) analyze incentives for technology adoption in the presence of network
externalities. Their analyses, however, are in the framework of one-sided market and
address a very di¤erent set of questions from ours. Elsewhere in Choi and Jeon (in
progress), we analyze platformsincentives to improve the value of services for consumers
and advertising technology in two-sided markets. In this analysis, we focus on whether the
platforms have overinvestment or underinvestment in each side of the market compared
to the socially optimal outcome rather than biases in the technology adoption decisions.
Thus, these two papers investigate di¤erent aspects of technological competition and
should be viewed complementary.
More recent work on the direction of innovation is also related to our paper in that the
main focus is on the direction or research rather than the quantity of R&D. Bryan and
Lemus (2017) show that "racing" and "underappropriation" distortions lead to ine¢ cient
allocation of resources even if the aggregate quantity of research is optimal. Choi and
Gerlach (2014) analyze selection biases in the project choice of complementary technolo-
gies which allow innovating rms to hold up rivals who succeed in developing other system
components with patents. They show that patents make innovation rewards independent
of project di¢ culties and rms excessively cluster their R&D e¤orts on a relatively easier
technology in order to preemptively claim stakes on component property rights. Finally,
Chen, Pan, and Zhang (2018) investigates how patentability standards may a¤ect the rate
and direction of cumulative innovation in an industry where rms can conduct R&D in
multiple directions. Our paper uncovers a di¤erent type of ine¢ ciency that arises due to
the two-sidedness of platform markets even in the absence of "racing" component which
plays an important role in all three papers discussed here.
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) andMiklos-Thal and Sha¤er (forthcoming) provide a general
analysis of pass-through as an economic tool and provide applications to tax incidence,
optimal procurement, third-degree price discrimination, etc. To our knowledge, the pass-
through equalization result that we obtained both in the monopoly and the duopoly is
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new as the existing literature does not compare the pass-through rate of the consumer
side surplus to consumers with that of the advertiser side surplus to consumers. For
instance, Weyl and Fabinger (2013) and Miklos-Thal and Sha¤er (forthcoming) focus on
the pass-through of the marginal cost to consumers, which is similar to the pass-through
of advertiser surplus (with an opposite sign) in our framework as we set the marginal cost
to zero. By contrast, they do not consider pass-through of consumer surplus. The same
remarks apply to papers on two-sided markets that employ pass-through rate for a part of
their analysis such as Bedre-Defolie and Calvano (2013) and Anderson and Peitz (2020).
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In section 2, we analyze a
monopoly platform. We endogenously derive conditions under which services are provided
for free and show that the bias in technology adoption runs in the opposite direction
depending on whether the non-negative price constraint is binding or not. Section 3
considers a duopoly model of competitive bottleneck (Armstrong, 2005). We also illustrate
the general results for the duopoly case by analyzing the Hotelling model and the logit
model. Section 4 provides a summary with discussion. Section 5 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Monopoly Platform
Consider a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market. Let u and p respectively denote
the gross surplus per consumer and the price charged by the platform on the consumer
side. The number of consumers on board depends on the net surplus s provided by the
platform, where s = u   p, and is represented by D(s): We assume that D(:) is strictly
increasing and weakly concave.
When the platform attracts consumers, each additional consumer allows the platform
to generate additional revenue from the other side. For instance, we can envision a situa-
tion in which the platform sells content to consumers and use the customer base to derive
advertising revenues from advertisers who need access to consumers. Another source of
revenue could be in-app purchases. For simplicity, we assume that the platform can gen-
erate a total surplus of  per consumer on the advertiser side. We adopt a parsimonious
reduced form modeling in that the platform can extract a  proportion of the surplus,
where  2 (0; 1]. In other words, on the advertising side, each consumer generates an
ad revenue of  to the platform. We provide a microfoundation of this model in the
Appendix.
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A main reason for which we model the advertising market in a reduced form is that
the boundary of the advertising market is much broader than that of a product market.
Consider the case of the programmatic display advertising market, which sells display
advertising inventories through real-time auctions. In this market, all kinds of publishers
(including online newspapers) and content producers compete together with social media
on the supply side. Most publishers and content producers rely on various advertising
intermediaries to sell their advertising inventories to a large number of advertisers. Hence,
even if a publisher is a monopolist in its product market, it has no or little market power
on the advertising side of which the outcome is largely determined by the total supply
and the total demand conditions. One important factor determining  is what is called
"ad tech tax", which represents the share taken by ad intermediaries from the advertising
expenditure paid by advertisers. Small platforms such as online newspapers that rely on
ad intermediaries have a smaller  while big tech platforms that have built their own
digital ad ecosystem and hence are not subject to ad tech tax would have a larger  (See
Section 4 for more details).
We assume that the marginal cost of serving a consumer is normalized to zero, without
loss of generality. Hence, the platforms prot is
(p;u; ) = D(u  p)(p+ ):
Maximizing it with respect to p gives the following rst order condition (F.O.C.):
@(p;u; )
@p
=  D0(u  p)(p+ ) +D(u  p) = 0: (1)
Let the price that satises the above condition be denoted by ep. As is typical in
two-sided markets, because of the extra revenue that can be generated by the advertising
side, the optimal price on the consumer side may entail below cost pricing (see Armstrong
(2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006)). When the marginal cost is low or even zero as in
the digital markets, this implies that the optimal price can be negative. However, we
impose the non-negative price constraint because negative prices can invite opportunistic
behaviors by consumers due to various moral hazard and adverse selection reasons (Farrell
and Gallini (1988), Armstrong and Wright (2007), Amelio and Jullien (2012) and Choi
and Jeon (forthcoming)).1 Indeed, one of the main goals in this paper is to illustrate the
1See Choi and Jeon (forthcoming) for more detailed discussion of the non-negative price constraint.
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importance of the non-negative price constraint on the technology adoption choice.
With the non-negative price constraint, the optimal monopoly price is given by p =
max[ ep; 0]: The maximized prot, denoted by m(u; ), can be written as
m(u; ) =Max
p0
D(u  p)(p+ ) = D(u  p)(p + );
where the superscript m represents monopoly. Let the aggregate consumer surplus (CS)
be denoted by v(s); where v(:) satises the envelope condition v0(s) = D(s): We can also
dene the corresponding social welfare given (u; ).
Wm(u; ) = m(u; ) + v(u  p)| {z }
Consumer Surplus
+D(u  p)(1  )| {z }
Advertiser Surplus
:
Consider now a technology adoption that changes (u; ). To analyze this, consider a
local locus of (u0; 0) that would provide the same monopoly prot, where u0 = u + du
and 0 =  + d: This locus can be derived by
dm(u; ) = D0(u  p)(p + )| {z }
PMBu
du+D(u  p)| {z }
PMB
d = 0; (2)
where PMBu (PMB) refers to the private marginal benet from an increase in u (in ).
Note that we can ignore the indirect e¤ects through p since the envelope theorem applies
when p > 0 and there is no response in p when p = 0. The iso-prot curve for the
monopolist, i.e., the locus of new technologies that would yield the same monopoly prot,







0(u  p)(p + )
D(u  p) (3)
Similarly, we can derive the technology adoption locus that yields the same social
welfare, the iso-welfare curve, as follows:
dWm(u; ) = dm(u; )
+[v0(u  p) +D0(u  p)(1  )] (du  dp)| {z }
External E¤ects on CS
+D(u  p)(1  )d| {z }
External E¤ects on AS
,
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where AS means advertiser surplus. The discrepancy between private and social incentives
arises due to the external e¤ects of the platforms decision on consumers and advertisers.







where SMBu and SMB refer to the social marginal benet from an increase in u and ,
respectively, and are given by
SMBu = D
0(u  p)(p + )









To analyze private and social incentives for technology adoption and identify potential
biases in the market outcome, we compare the slopes of the iso-prot and iso-welfare curves
measured at the current level of (u; ).












) (see Figures 1 and 2).
As shown in Figure 1, when the slope of the iso-prot curve is steeper than that of







), we can nd two shaded areas in
which private and social incentives conict. The shaded area in the second quadrant
(hurting consumers, but beneting advertisers) represents technologies that would be
socially benecial, but would not be adopted by the monopolist. The shaded area in the
fourth quadrant (beneting consumers, but hurting advertisers), in contrast, represents
technologies that would be welfare-reducing but would be adopted by the monopolist.
In that sense, technology adoption incentives by the monopolist are biased towards the
consumer side surplus. Similarly, when the slope of the iso-welfare curve is steeper than
that of the iso-prot curve as in Figure 2, we can identify two areas that exhibit technology




When we compare the social marginal benet of an increase in u to the private one,
we nd





| {z } > 0
Note that (SMBu PMBu) contains two terms. First, an increase in u directly increases
both consumer surplus and advertiser surplus. Second, an increase in u indirectly reduces,
by increasing p, both consumer surplus and advertiser surplus. The net e¤ect of the two
is positive as long as the pass-through rate is smaller than one, i.e. dp
du
< 1, which holds
as we show below in Lemma 1.
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Similarly, we nd





As in the case for a change in u; (SMB PMB) contains two terms. First, an increase in
 directly increases advertiser surplus. Second, an increase in  indirectly increases, by
reducing p, both consumer surplus and advertiser surplus. Both e¤ects are positive.2
To analyze potential biases in technology adoption compared to the (second-best)
social optimum where the price decision is left to the platform, we distinguish two cases
depending on whether or not the non-negative price constraint (NPC) is binding. We
show that the direction of the market biases crucially depend on whether the NPC is
binding or not (i.e., whether the services to consumers are provided for free or not).
2.1 NPC Not Binding (p > 0)
When the NPC is not binding (that is, p > 0), the optimal price on the consumer side




D0(u  p)(p + )




This states that in order to neutralize the prot increase from one extra unit of u, the
reduction in  should be 1= unit, leading to the slope of the iso-prot curve equal to
 1= .
In the non-binding NPC case, we have the following lemma which establishes some
useful properties of the pass-through rates of u and .

































2D0  D00(p+ ) < 0;
2If we analyze R&D incentives to increase (u; ), this analysis suggests that the monopolist has less
incentives to do R&D compared to the social planner on both sides. See Choi and Jeon (in progress) for
a related analysis on this.
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because D is assumed to be weakly concave and strictly increasing.





















to CS from an increase in 
Consider rst a benchmark in which the monopoly platform can fully extract ad-
vertiser surplus (i.e.,  = 1). In this case, we show below that there is no bias in the
platforms technology adoption compared to the social optimum. This no bias result is
a consequence of the pass-through equalization result in Corollary 1, which means that
with full extraction of advertiser surplus by the platform, an increase in u confers the
same level of surplus to the consumer side as an increase in  does.
With full extraction of surplus on the advertiser side, the discrepancy between the
social incentive and the private one comes only from the e¤ect on consumer surplus. As
the magnitudes of external e¤ects coming from an increase in u and  are exactly the
same by the "pass-through rate equalization" result, there is no bias in private technology
adoption decisions.
More precisely, when  = 1; we have:
















implies that the gap between the social marginal benet and the
private one is equalized across the two sides. This together with PMBuj=1 = PMBj=1






jdm=0 =  1 when  = 1:
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Therefore, when the monopolist platform can fully extract advertiser surplus, it exhibits
no bias in technology adoption.
Consider now the case of imperfect extraction of advertiser surplus, i.e.,  < 1. Intu-
itively, in this case the private incentives would be CS-biased as the surplus given to the
advertiser side with an increase in  would not be internalized by the platform. Indeed,
we have













D(u  p) D0(u  p)(p+ ) dp
d| {z }
0
Proof. See the Appendix.









for  2 (0; 1) :
Therefore, we nd that imperfect extraction of advertiser surplus induces the plat-
forms technology adoption incentives biased against advertisers, which is very intuitive
given that the platform does not internalize the surplus left to advertisers and that it
exhibits no bias when it fully extracts advertiser surplus.
In summary, we have:
Proposition 1. Consider a monopolistic two-sided platform. If the non-negative pricing
constraint does not bind on the consumer side, its technology adoption incentive is CS-
biased unless it can fully extract advertiser surplus (in which case its incentive is unbiased).
2.2 NPC Binding (p = 0)
The non-negative price constraint is binding if the following condition holds:
@(p;u; )
@p
jp=0 =  D0(u) +D(u) < 0: (5)
If the constraint is binding, the monopoly prot is given by
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m(u; ) = D(u);
where  2 (0; 1]: Therefore, the locus of technology adoptions that would provide the
same monopoly prot is given by
dm(u; ) = D0(u)| {z }
PMBu















where the inequality is from (5). The iso-prot curve does not depend on  when the
NPC is binding. Note that the R.H.S. of the inequality,   1

, is the slope of the iso-prot
curve (d
du
jdm=0) when the NPC does not bind (see (4)). Therefore, the absolute slope
of the iso-prot curve becomes steeper, implying that the platform values an increase in
u relatively more than an increase in  when the NPC is binding. This is because the
NPC is binding when  is relatively large (see condition (5)), which induces the platform
to value an increase in u relatively more to attract additional consumers.
Social welfare is given by
Wm(u; ) = m(u; ) + v(u) +D(u)(1  ):
Hence, the locus of technology adoptions that would provide the same welfare is given by
dWm(u; ) = [D(u) +D0(u)]| {z }
SMBu













Note that the iso-welfare curve does not depend on  either.
When we compare the slopes of the indi¤erence curves, we get
d
du




Since none of the two indi¤erence curves depend on  , in order to get intuition, we
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can focus on  = 1. Then, we have
SMBuj=1   PMBuj=1 = D(u);
SMBj=1   PMBj=1 = 0:
On the consumer side, the monopolist does not internalize the increase in consumer surplus
and hence the private marginal benet is smaller than the social one. In contrast, on the
advertising side, the social marginal benet is exactly equal to the private one. Therefore,
when the non-negative price constraint is binding (i.e., p = 0), there is an unambiguous
bias against the technology adoption that enhances consumer surplus.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 2. Consider a monopolistic two-sided platform. If the non-negative pricing
constraint binds on the consumer side, its technology adoption incentive is always AS-
biased (i.e. biased against a consumer-surplus increasing technology).
3 Competitive Bottleneck: Duopoly with Horizontal Di¤eren-
tiation
In this section, we analyze technology adoption incentives by competing platforms. Our
model involves two (symmetric) horizontally di¤erentiated platforms. In particular, we
consider a competitive bottleneck situation in which the platforms compete to attract
single-homing consumers and use the customer base to derive advertising revenues from
advertisers who need access to consumers.
3.1 Duopoly Competition with Horizontal Di¤erentiation
We consider two symmetric platforms 1 and 2. Let si = ui pi represent the net surplus a
consumer obtains from platform i = 1; 2. The number of consumers for platform i is given
by Di(s1; s2). We consider a symmetric demand: D1(s; s0) = D2(s0; s): Let subscripts
denote partial derivatives such that Dii  @D
i
@si
and Dij  @D
i
@sj
, where i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j..
The symmetric demand implies D11(s; s
0) = D22(s
0; s) and D12(s; s
0) = D21(s
0; s):
Assumption 1. (i) Dii > 0, D
i
j < 0, (ii) D
i
i 
Dij, and (iii) Diii  0 for i = 1; 2 and
i 6= j.
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This is a standard assumption. A1(i) means that each platforms demand increases in
its surplus provided to consumers, while it decreases in the surplus provided to consumers
by the rival platform. A1(ii) means that the own e¤ect weakly dominates the cross e¤ect.
With the symmetry of demand, A1(ii) also captures the market expansion e¤ect with
Dii + D
j
i  0 for i = 1; 2 and i 6= j; when Dii + D
j
i = 0, the overall market size is xed
and there is no market expansion. Finally, A1(iii) means that the demand is concave
in its own surplus provided to consumers, which is a su¢ cient condition to satisfy the
second order condition of the prot maximization. As long as the second order condition
is satised, we can allow for Diii > 0.
When u1 = u2 = u and 1 = 2 = , platform is prot is
i = (pi + )D
i(u  pi; u  pj):
The F.O.C. is given by
@i
@pi
=  (pi + )Dii +Di = 0:
The second-order condition is satised under Assumption 1:
@2i
@p2i
= (pi + )D
i
ii   2Dii < 0





=  Dii(u; u) +Di(u; u) < 0: (7)
In such a case, each platform charges zero price on the consumer side and each platforms
prot is Di(u; u) in a symmetric equilibrium.
3.2 Technology Adoption with the NPC Not Binding
As we consider symmetric equilibrium, let us consider platform 1 as the representative
one. When the NPC is not binding and prices are positive, platform 1s prot can be
written as
1(p;u;) = (p1 + 1)D
1(u1   p1; u2   p2);
where p;u; denote vectors of the associated variables.




= 0 =) D1 = (p1 + 1)D11 (8)
We derive the locus of (unilateral) technology adoption choices which would yield the
same prot for platform 1:














where we suppress the arguments for demand functions. Then, we can derive the slope of















where the superscript d represents duopoly. Recall that the locus associated with the






If we compare the duopoly locus (d1
du1
jdd=0) to the monopoly locus (ddu jdm=0), both the
numerator and the denominator have one additional term which represents the strategic






By using the F.O.C. (8), Eq. (9) can be written as






























































Let social welfare be
W (u;) = v(u1   p1; u2   p2) + (p1 + 1)D1(u1   p1; u2   p2)
+(1  )1D1(u1   p1; u2   p2) + (p2 + 2)D2(u1   p1; u2   p2);
where v(u1  p1; u2  p2) denotes consumer welfare function that represents the aggregate
consumer surplus.
Let us assume that consumer welfare function can be written as v(s1; s2) = ev(g1(s1)+
g2(s2)), where ev0 > 0, g0i > 0. Then, we have D1=ev0(g1(s1)+ g2(s2))g01(s1) by the envelope
theorem. The locus of technology adoption choices which would yield the same welfare










D1 + (p1 + 1)D
1






























+D1d1 = 0 (11)
After collecting terms in (11) and using the F.O.C. (8), we can show that in a symmetric
equilibrium (see the Appendix for the derivation)

































The iso-welfare curve for platform 1s technology adoption choices can be written as
d1
du1


























The following two corollaries come immediately from (10) and (12).
Corollary 3. (convergence to the monopoly) Consider the limit case of no competition in
the duopoly with no cross-rm demand and strategic e¤ects; D12 = D
2



















where D1 and D11 can be considered as counterparts to D and D
0 in the monopoly, respec-
tively.
Corollary 4. When there is no market expansion (i.e., Dii(s; s) +D
j
i (s; s) = 0) and the
NPC does not bind,
d1
du1
jdW d=0 =  1:
As in the monopoly case, the following lemma on pass-through rates plays a key role
in establishing the direction of technology adoption bias for the duopoly case.



























Proof. See the Appendix.
In Lemma 4(i), the rst equation about the own e¤ect is similar to what we have in
the monopoly case in Lemma 2. The second is about the strategic e¤ect. In Lemma 4(ii),
2D11+D
1








which we assume to hold.
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As in the monopoly case, with full extraction of advertiser surplus by the platforms,
an increase in ui and an increase in i confer the same level of surplus to the consumers
of platform i. Furthermore, in the duopoly case, pass-through rates via strategic price
e¤ects are also equalized across the consumer and advertiser sides: an increase in ui and
an increase in i confer the same level of surplus to the consumers of platform j through
a change in pj.


























































+ (1  ))(D11 +D21)
i  0:
Despite the presence of strategic price e¤ects in the duopoly case, we can derive sur-
prisingly parallel results to the monopoly case. In particular, we nd that there is no bias
in technology adoption when the platforms can extract full surplus from the advertiser
side ( = 1). Once again, the duopoly version of the "pass-through rate equalization"
result plays a key role for this outcome when  = 1. As in the monopoly case, the mag-
nitudes of external e¤ects coming from an increase in u and  on the consumer side are
exactly the same, resulting in no bias in private technology adoption decisions even in
the presence of the strategic e¤ects with competition. Similarly, when  < 1, the plat-
forms cannot extract the full surplus from the advertiser side, which leads to CS-biased
technology adoption.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 3. Consider a competitive bottleneck model of duopoly platforms with hor-
20
izontal di¤erentiation. If the NPC does not bind on the consumer side, a platforms
unilateral technology adoption incentive is CS-biased if it cannot fully extract advertiser
surplus; its incentive is unbiased if it fully extracts advertiser surplus.
3.3 Technology Adoption with the NPC Binding
Consider the case where the non-negative price constraint is binding. Recall that the
NPC is binding when (7) holds. In this case,
1(p = 0;u;) = 1D
1(u1; u2):





1(u1; u2)d1 = 0









where the inequality is from (7). Note rst that (13) is exactly the same as the corre-
sponding formula in the monopoly case (6). In particular, the iso-prot curve does not




jdd=0 when the NPC
does not bind. Thus, as in the monopoly case, the absolute slope of the iso-prot curve
becomes steeper when the NPC becomes binding, implying that the platform values an
increase in u relatively more than an increase in  when the NPC is binding.
Social welfare with the NPC binding is given by
W (u;) = v(u1; u2) + 1D
1(u1; u2)
+(1  )1D1(u1; u2) + 2D2(u1; u2):























jdW d=0 =  





As in the monopoly case, the iso-welfare curve does not depend on  .
Corollary 6. When there is no market expansion (i.e., Dii(s; s) +D
j




jdW d=0 =  1:
Corollary 4 and 6 together imply that when there is no market expansion, d1
du1
jdW d=0 =
 1 regardless of whether the NPC binds or not.







0BBB@1 + D21D1(u; u)| {z }
Business Stealing E¤ect
1CCCA (15)
Thus, the comparison of the private incentive with the social one depends on the relative
magnitude of
 D21D1(u;u)  vs. 1. If competition is weak and the demand is more or less






jdW=0, as in the case of the monopoly
platform. However, if competition is intense (D21 is a large negative number) and  is







Proposition 4. Consider a competitive bottleneck model of duopoly platforms with hor-
izontal di¤erentiation. If the NPC binds on the consumer side, its technology adoption
incentive is AS-biased as in the monopoly case if competition is weak whereas its incentive
is CS-biased if competition is intense and the business stealing e¤ect is strong.
In the following two subsections, we illustrate our results on the duopoly case for the
Hotelling and logit models.
3.4 Hotelling Model
In the Hotelling model, the optimal prices given symmetric (u; ) can be derived in the
following way (assuming that u is su¢ ciently large and the consumer side market is
22














Hence, the demand function Di(si; sj) satises A1: in particular, we have Dii =
Dij.












The rst order conditions for each rm yield the following reaction functions.
pi = Ri(pj;u; i) =
t+ (ui   uj)  i + pj
2
:
Note that the prot is strictly concave in pi and hence the second-order condition is
satised. By solving the two reaction functions simultaneously, we can derive the Nash
equilibrium prices as
pi = t+
(ui   uj)  (2i + j)
3
In what follows, we consider a symmetric equilibrium.
Consider rst the case where p1 = p

2 = p
 > 0, which occurs i¤ t > . Then, we can












We also know from the previous general analysis that when the NPC is binding (that









If D1 +D2 is constant like in the Hotelling model with full market coverage, we have
D11 +D
2
1 = 0. Hence, from Corollary 4 and 6, we nd
d1
du1
jdW d=0 =  1;
regardless of whether the NPC binds or not.
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regardless of whether the NPC binds or not. But when  = 1,
d1
du1




if the NPC is not binding; otherwise, we have d1
du1
jdW=0 > d1du1 jd1=0:
Proposition 5. Consider the Hotelling model. For  2 (0; 1), each platforms technology
adoption incentive is CS-biased regardless of whether or not the NPC binds; if  = 1,
each platforms technology adoption incentive is unbiased if the NPC does not bind and is
CS-biased if the NPC binds.
The intuition for the result can be given as follows. When the NPC does not bind,
the technology adoption is CS-biased regardless of the market structure. When the NPC
binds, we have t <  and hence the platforms compete aggressively to attract consumers
in order to generate advertising revenues, which generates a bias toward the consumer
side.
3.5 Logit Demand Model
Consider a discrete choice model of price competition with logit demand
Di(ui   pi; uj   pj) =
exp[(ui   pi)=t]P2
k=0 exp[(uk   pk)=t
= i;
where the outside good, good 0, has a utility of u0 with price zero (i.e. p0 = 0) and
t(> 0) represents the degree of product di¤erentiation. The total number of consumers is
normalized to 1 and i is the proportion of consumers who use platform i:
It can be shown that the F.O.C. for prot maximization (8) with logit demand can be
written as
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(p1 + ) = t
exp[(u1   p1)=t]
P2
k=0 exp[(uk   pk)=t






3.5.1 NPC Not Binding
In a symmetric equilibrium in which 1 = 2 =  2 (0; 1=2) and 0 = 1   2 > 0, we
verify in the Appendix that the general results on pass-through rates in Lemma 4(i) are






















Hence, the technology adoption incentive is always CS-biased for all  2 (0; 1): When
 = 1; the private incentive coincides with the social one.
3.5.2 NPC Binding
In the logit demand case, the equilibrium price would be zero (i.e., the NPC binding) if
  t
























+ 2 exp u
t
< 1=2:
Thus, we can conclude that each platforms incentive to adopt technology is AS-biased
(CS-biased) if t >  (t < ):
3.5.3 Summary for Logit Demand
Note that the NPC binds if and only if t < (1   ): Taken together, we can have
two cases depending on the relative magnitudes of (1   ) and : Because  < 1=2;
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we have a   2 (0; 1) such that (1   )   if and only if    . For  <  , the
NPC binding implies t < : the NPC binding implies that the adoption incentive is
CS-biased. For  >  , when the NPC binds, we can have both CS-bias and AS-bias
depending on the sign of t   : The logit demand model with market expansion thus
reveals further insight on the importance of the share of the advertising surplus that each
platform captures (represented by ).
In summary, we have
Proposition 6. In the logit model, there exists a   2 (0; 1) such that
(i) When  <   (that is, (1 ) < ), a duopolistic platforms technology adoption
incentives are always CS-biased regardless of whether the NPC is binding or not.
(ii) When     (that is, (1   ) > ), a duopolistic platforms technology
adoption incentives are CS-biased if t > (1 ) (with the NPC not binding) or t < 
(with the NPC binding). However, if t is in the intermediate range (i.e.,  < t <
(1  )), then the NPC is binding and incentives are AS-biased. When  = 1, there is
no bias if the NPC does not bind.
Therefore, when    , we may have non-monotonicity in technology adoption incen-
tives. When t < , the NPC is binding and competition to attract consumers is intense,
which leads to CS-biased technology adoption. As t becomes larger than , the NPC is
still binding, but competition is relaxed. As a result, technology adoption patterns exhibit
AS-bias. Once t becomes very large and exceeds (1  ) , the NPC does not bind any
more and platform incentives revert back to CS-bias.
4 Summary and Discussions
We have found that the direction of biases in innovation adoption crucially depends on
whether the non-negative price constraint is binding or not. More specically, when the
NPC is not binding and the equilibrium prices fully respond to changes in (u;), the
market equilibrium in technology adoption is CS-biased both in monopoly and duopoly.
If the NPC is binding and the services are provided for free, the market equilibrium is AS-
biased if the market structure is monopolistic or competition is weak in duopoly. However,
if competition is intense and the business stealing e¤ect is strong, the bias can be reversed
and becomes CS-biased in contrast to the monopoly case. The following table summarizes
and compares technology adoption incentives for the monopoly and the duopoly platform
cases.
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Biases in Technology Adoption
The duopoly analysis of the logit model and the Hotelling model conrms the general
nding. Furthermore, it generates additional useful insights. First, the analysis of the
Hotelling model shows that in a mature market with little market expansion, the technol-
ogy adoption incentive is always CS-biased. More importantly, the analysis of the logit
model, which applies to a market with market expansion possibility, identies the key
role played by  , the share of the advertising surplus that each platform captures. If  is
small, then the platformsincentives are always CS-biased. In other words, a necessary
condition for technology adoption to be biased against consumers is that  is not too
small.
A wide range of publishers (including online newspapers) sell their advertising inven-
tory to a wide range of advertisers through a complex chain of intermediaries that run
real-time auctions on behalf of the publishers and advertisers. The intermediation ecosys-
tem has evolved into a complex vertical chain of specialized providers such as publisher ad
servers, SSPs (supply side platforms) including ad exchanges, DSPs (demand side plat-
forms), advertiser ad servers. Google is dominant at each layer of intermediary. Various
studies estimated what is called "ad tech tax",3 the share taken by ad intermediaries from
the advertising expenditure paid by advertisers. For instance, according to the CMA re-
port (2020), a lower bound of the ad tech tax is 35 percent, meaning that on average
publishers receive at best 65% of the initial advertising revenue paid by advertisers. By
contrast, large platforms such as Google and Facebook have built their own advertising
ecosystem and hence are not subject to ad tech tax when they sell their advertising in-
ventories. Therefore, in the context of our model,  of large platforms is much larger
than  of publishers who rely on ad intermediaries, implying that the formers technology
adoption incentive is much more likely to be AS-biased than the latters incentive.
Our analysis can also be interpreted as platformsincentives to adopt policies that cre-
ate trade-o¤s between the consumer side and the advertiser side: privacy policy, ad load
3See for instance, ANA (2017), Plum (2019) and the CMA report (2020).
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policy, the weight to place on quality (i.e. relevance of ads to consumers) over prices in de-
termining the winning bid in auction mechanisms, etc. For instance, a platforms privacy
policy can be interpreted as having a similar e¤ect as a technology adoption in that collec-
tion of consumerssensitive information may impose privacy costs on the consumers, but
may help increase advertising revenues. A monopolistic platform (or a duopolistic plat-
form facing weak competition) providing free services would have an excessive incentive
to adopt a privacy policy that harms consumers in favor of advertising revenues. This
is consistent with the Cambridge Analytica Scandal in which Cambridge Analytica took
advantage of Facebooks lax privacy policy, which enabled third-party developers to har-
vest not only data about their users but also data about their usersfriends.4 Our results
suggest that the lax privacy policy can be a consequence of the exercise of Facebooks
market power.
The choice of ad load or the relative weight placed on quality metrics over bid prices
in determining the winning bid can be analyzed in a similar way. More specically, in the
case of a search engine, a higher ad load by showing a greater proportion of ads relative
to organic search results can increase the propensity of users to click on ads. However,
the more ads are shown, the more likely it is that some ad content will be less relevant
to the user search query, compromising the quality experienced by the user (the CMA
Report, 2020, p. 223). The CMA (2020) nds that Google has been able to generate
higher click-through rates by increasing its ad load.5 In the case of display advertising, a
higher ad load can lead to a greater immediate nancial reward, but inicts more nuisance
costs on consumers. The CMA (2020) also nds that the number of impressions served
per hour on Facebook has increased from 40-50 in 2016 to 50-60 in 2019 and states that
this increase in ad load partly explains why Facebooks revenue per hour is greater than
other platforms and has increased in the past four years (p. 259).
4Cambridge Analytica created a personality test that would target American Facebook users. Two
hundred seventy thousand people were paid one or two dollars each to take a test, which was designed to
collect the personality traits of the test taker as well as data about friends and their Facebook activities.
They had more than forty-nine million friends. See McNamee (2019).
5In 2016, Google removed right-hand side ads and increased from three to four the number of ads
eligible to appear above the organic search results. Later in 2016, Google introduced Expanded Text Ads,
which allows advertisers to enhance their ads with an optional third headline and a second description (the
CMA report, 2020, p.233). In addition, several advertisers submitted to the CMA that recent changes
to Googles policies on ad load and the presentation of search advertising had the e¤ect of increasing the
propensity for users to click on ads rather than organic links (the CMA report, 2020, p.237).
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed how market power a¤ects platformsincentives to adopt
technological innovations. As many two-sided platforms provide free services to consumers
and generate revenues by charging the other side, our analysis in particular focuses on two-
sided platforms which may nd it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and
to extract surplus on the advertising side. In such a framework, we consider innovations
that a¤ect both sides in an opposite way and study a platforms incentives to trade-o¤
the gain from one side with the loss from the other side. We compare private incentives
with social incentives across di¤erent market structures (monopoly platform and duopoly
competitive bottleneck) in order to identify biases in innovation generated by platform
market power.
We have found that the direction of biases in technology adoption crucially depends on
whether the non-negative price constraint is binding or not. When it is not binding, adop-
tion incentive is biased toward consumer-surplus-increasing technology both in monopoly
and duopoly. If the NPC is binding, adoption incentive is biased toward advertiser-surplus-
increasing technology if the market structure is monopolistic or competition is weak in
duopoly but biased toward consumer-surplus-increasing technology if competition is in-
tense. Our results thus provide a rationale for a tougher competition policy to curb
concentration if competition authorities put more weight on consumer surplus in welfare
calculations.
Our analysis has relied on a di¤erential technique and focused on technology adop-
tions that are local in nature. However, the driving force in our analysis would apply to
technology adoptions that are discrete as long as the sign of the derivatives in our analysis
remains the same along the path.
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A Microfoundation of the Advertising Side Market
We provide a microfoundation of the advertising side that would yield the model
assumed in the main text. Let us assume that there are two categories of products. Each
consumer demands products from only one category. A priori, each category of products
is equally likely to be demanded by each consumer. In each category, there is a measure
1 of varieties, each of which is produced by monopolistic producers. To sell the product,
each rm needs to advertise to inform consumers of the existence and price of the good
as in Anderson and Coate (2005) and Choi (2006). Platforms provide such a channel
and allow them to be matched with consumers. Let us assume that only a mass z of
monopoly producers of new goods can be matched with a consumer. This may be due to
the advertising space limitation or consumers limited attention. New goods are produced
with a constant marginal cost of zero without any loss of generality.
We consider a two tier matching process between a consumer and advertisers. First,
the platform transmits to the advertisers the data about the consumers prole and its
prediction about the category the consumer is interested in. In addition, the platform
announces the number of advertising slots. Second, based on the prole and the predicted
category, advertisers estimate their willingness to pay for a slot. The slots are allocated
according to the second-price auction: the winning bidders pay the highest losing bid.
Within a category, each new product is characterized by a parameter  2 [0; 1], which
represents the probability that the product will appeal to the consumer. If a product
appeals to the consumer, the consumer is willing to pay $. We assume that  is distrib-
uted according to F (:): We assume that F is increasing and continuously di¤erentiable.
When a consumer is matched with a product in the wrong category, the consumer has no
demand for it. Since a consumer will pay $ or zero, each new producers optimal price is
$: The platform attempts to match a consumer with the right category products, but the
match is not perfect. The platforms ability to match a consumer with the right product
is represented by a probability of match '(> 1=2). A producer belonging to the category
predicted by the platform has a willingness to pay to be advertised via the platform given
by '$: Let us dene  by
z = 1  F ()
We assume that  > 1 '
'
: This condition implies that it is optimal for the platform to ll
all advertising slots for a consumer with products from the category that is more likely to
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suit the consumer. We also assume that the advertising slot is limited and it is optimal
to ll all slots. This condition is given by  > m, where m = argmax
a
(1  F ()):
A platforms advertising revenue per consumer is given by z'$ = z'F 1(1  z)$
and the advertisersnet surplus is given by '$
R 1
(  
)dF (): Then, we can set
 = z'F 1(1  z)$ + '$
Z 1















We can interpret an increase in  comes from a platforms better targeting technology
in matching a consumer with the right product category, that is, an increase in ' . Notice
that  is independent of ' (and ):
Proof of Lemma 3
From the F.O.C. (1), we have
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1)D
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Hence,
































Proof of Lemma 4


































where the second equality comes from the F.O.C. Similarly, fully di¤erentiating the F.O.C.































= y: By summing
up the two conditions above, we have




























By proceeding in a similar manner for 1 and 2;we derive two corresponding condi-
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= z: Summing up
the two conditions above gives us





























































As a result, we have
 (1  x  y) =  (w + z)






Let us consider a candidate solution, which is z = y, w =  (1  x): We can easily
verify that this candidate solution satises all equations above simultaneously. This proves
that the pass-through rates in the duopoly model satises the following relationships.
(1  dp1
du1









By solving equations above simultaneously, we can also derive that6











































































































Technology Adoption Bias with Logit Demand when the NPC is Not Binding
The F.O.C. can be written as







Fully di¤erentiating (17) with respect to u1 gives
dp1
du1





































Fully di¤erentiating (17) with respect to u2 gives
dp1
du2









exp[(u1   p1)=t] + (1 
dp2
du2
) exp[(u2   p2)=t];
which is equivalent to, at symmetric equilibrium,
dp1
du2
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(1  )2   4 < 0





































Fully di¤erentiating (17) with respect to 2 gives
dp1
d2













































=   (1  )
3





(1  )2   4 < 0
We thus can conrm Lemma 4(i)
(1  dp1
du1







































































































1   ( dp1d1 +
dp2
d1















[(p1 + 1 + (1  )1)(D11 +D21)]
(p1 + 1)D
1
1   ( dp1d1 +
dp2
d1
) [(p1 + 1 + (1  )1)(D11 +D21)]
=  











































Hence, if  = 1,
d1
du1
jdW d=0 =  1 =
d1
du1
jdd=0:
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